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Economic Perspectives on Trade in
Professional Services
Jagdish N. Bhagwatit
This paper will bring an economist's perspective to bear on
three questions raised at this conference by some of the other im-
portant contributions:
(1) How are services different from goods;
(2) What implications do these differences have for the rules
we seek to negotiate to free trade in services; and
(3) How can we induce the key developing countries, such as
Brazil, Egypt and India, which have generally opposed liberaliza-
tion of trade in services, to support it?
Answers to these questions will naturally bear critically on the
narrower question of international trade in professional, and espe-
cially legal, services, since recommendations and decisions on a
component of the service sector cannot properly be made until the
broader perspectives and principles are addressed and understood.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOODS AND SERVICES
As Geza Feketekuty has made abundantly clear,' the interest
in service trade is very recent. One byproduct of this is that the
relevant data are both unreliable and far too limited. The limita-
tions on data now available are a function not only of logistical
problems in data collection, but also of unresolved conceptual
questions which impair our present ability to generate meaningful
and adequate statistics on the matter at hand. It is still not clear,
for example, how services are to be defined, or how they are differ-
ent from goods.
A. Non-Storability
Perhaps the earliest useful attempt to define the distinction
t Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics and Political Science, Columbia University.
This paper is based on comments made at the University of Chicago Legal Forum sympo-
sium on "Barriers to International Trade in Professional Services", February 8, 1986.
Geza Feketekuty, Trade in Professional Services: An Overview, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F.
1.
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between services and goods was made by T.P. Hill only one decade
ago.2 Hill focused on the non-storability of services, stressing that
services must be consumed as they are produced and cannot be put
into stock by producers. This key characteristic does not cover all
items which we customarily report as services; "answering ser-
vices," for example, do store messages nowadays. Such exceptions,
however, do not detract from the usefulness of a definition of ser-
vices that characterizes them as non-storable because they require
simultaneous provision and use.
B. User-Producer Interaction
If services must be used as they are produced, there must be
interaction between the user and the provider of the service. A
producer of goods, by contrast, can generally store the finished
product and transact with users at any subsequent time. This in-
teraction, in turn, implies that we can contemplate two essential
categories of services: those that necessarily require the physical
proximity of the user and the provider, and those that do not,
though such physical proximity may indeed be useful even in the
second category.' "Basically one has to draw a distinction between
services as embodied in the supplier of the services and requiring
[the supplier's] physical presence where the user happens to be
and services which can be disembodied from the supplier and pro-
vided without a physical presence being necessary."'
See T.P. Hill, On Goods and Services, Review of Income and Wealth 315-38 (1977).
There is, however, no dearth of earlier discussion, beginning with Adam Smith and John
Stuart Mill. See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book I, ch. 3 (1776); John Stuart
Mill, Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, Essay III (1844).
If the interaction of economic agents were omitted from the definition of services, all
activity and value-added would fall within the service sector; yet this is far from the mean-
ing normally attributed to the word "services." Because services can exist only when eco-
nomic agents interact, every definition of services assumes the existence of an economic
organization or "market structure." This has what appears to be the arbitrary result that if
a worker paints a car on the assembly line inside an auto plant as an employee, his or her
wages are part of goods production and value-added. But if the same person does the same
job from his or her own establishment, the resulting wages or income are part of service
production and value-added. For a detailed discussion of this question, see Jagdish N.
Bhagwati, International Trade in Services and Its Relevance for Economic Development,
Xth Annual Lecture of the Geneva Association, delivered at the London School of Econom-
ics and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Services World Forum, Ge-
neva (November 1985) (drawing upon earlier commentary by several distinguished econo-
mists including Irving Kravis, Peter Bauer and Basil Yamey); Jagdish N. Bhagwati,
Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations, 7 World Econ. 133
(1984).
Bhagwati, 7 World Econ. at 141 (cited in note 3). In that article, I discuss the latter
class of services (here called "long-distance" services). I evaluate how the "disembodiment"
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1. Physical Proximity Essential. The class of services where
physical proximity between provider and user is essential is use-
fully thought of as consisting of three categories.
Category A: Immobile-User, Mobile-Provider. There is an im-
portant class of services which requires that the provider go to the
user, where the reverse mobility is simply impossible. For example,
when the Connecticut Turnpike was being built, an Indian or
South Korean construction firm bidding for the contract could per-
haps have provided the designs and skilled inputs from home base.
But such a firm simply could not have supplied the labor services,
except by moving Indian or South Korean labor to Connecticut
where the turnpike was to be built. Services of this sort are aptly
referred to as "temporary-factor-relocation-requiring" services.
Category B: Mobile-User, Immobile-Provider. There is an-
other important class of services where the user really must move
to the provider rather than the provider to the user. This location-
specificity of the provider arises from the fact that the service pro-
vided is a vector of characteristics, some key elements of which are
simply not transferable geographically to the user's location. Com-
plex neurosurgery, for example, simply cannot be done in Gabon
because, even though the Massachusetts General Hospital can fly
their surgeons over there, there is no way the necessary support
services and hospital care can be duplicated or even approximated.
Category C: Mobile-User, Mobile-Provider. Finally, there is a
range of services where mobility is symmetrically possible. For ex-
ample, haircuts and lectures are in principle transmittable between
user and provider in the location of either, the only difference be-
ing the cost of providing the service in one location rather than the
other.
2. Physical Proximity Inessential: The "Long-Distance"
Services. In the second broad class of services, physical proximity
between providers and users may be useful, but it is not, strictly
speaking, necessary. These are basically "long-distance" services,
in the sense that the transactions do not require the immediacy of
geographical proximity. Traditional banking and insurance services
would fall into this category, because loans and insurance policies
effect can frustrate immigration restrictions on skilled labor, and discuss the implications of
this effect for the developing countries' comparative advantage in services. Gary Sampson
and Richard Snape have drawn on this twofold distinction to explore instead the former
class of services, where physical proximity of the provider and the user is required, articulat-
ing a useful taxonomy for such services which I draw upon in the text below. Gary Sampson
and Richard Snape, Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services, 8 World Econ. 171-82
(1985).
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can be secured by mail or phone. The type of legal services here
discussed, however, presumably require continual contact with the
client. Because an attorney serving a corporation may have to in-
teract face-to-face with many of the corporation's employees, legal
services could be provided long-distance only in an extremely inef-
ficient and hence expensive fashion. This applies equally to a large
class of other professional services such as accounting or manage-
ment consulting.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS TAXONOMY
FOR SERVICE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
The above taxonomy of the service sector has significant im-
plications for the optimal structure of international negotiations in
service trade. I will focus here on the special considerations rele-
vant to trade in temporary-factor-relocation-requiring services,
which require the provider to move to the user.
First, because it requires factor relocation, trade in such ser-
vices simultaneously implies either direct foreign investment or la-
bor migration or both. Permitting trade in services, therefore, is
tantamount to permitting such factor flows. It is thus inappropri-
ate to think of such service trade in the customary category of
trade as distinguished from the category of factor flows: the two
are inextricably tied together. For this reason, it is preferable to
think of service transactions rather than of service trade.
Second, the opening up of such service transactions between
nations creates immediate difficulties stemming from the differ-
ences between what has traditionally been considered acceptable
with regard to factor flows as against trade, differences which often
reflect political sensitivities as well as economic considerations.
Thus, Frank Rossi, in his excellent contribution regarding the re-
straints on the operations of international accounting organiza-
tions, cites as one obstacle possible restrictions on the repatriation
of earnings encountered in several developing countries.' Yet these
are precisely the kind of restraints that apply to all direct foreign
investment in these countries. Moreover, domestic enterprises in
the same service sectors are subjected to the very same restrictions
arising from exchange control.
Yet analyzed as a trade issue, rather than as a transactional
issue, such restraints look totally unreasonable: the trade access is
Frank A. Rossi, Government Impediments and Professional Constraints on the Oper-
ations of International Accounting Organizations, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. 135.
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not meaningful unless profits can be repatriated. The lobbies
favoring increased facilitation of transactions in services will have
to keep this aspect of the problem very much in mind and pursue
their objectives slowly and delicately so as not to pressure hesitant
countries to the point where they opt out of negotiations that seem
to make impossible demands. Perhaps it is not for nothing that
Geza Feketekuty, who deserves much of the credit for opening up
the important subject of trade in services, keeps stressing the
trade, rather than the factor-movement, aspects of service
transactions.
The third implication of this two-sided nature of service trans-
actions is that attention must be paid to factor-mobility restric-
tions. Because they are in essence factor flows, service transactions
can be readily impeded simply by preventing the requisite factor
flows, rather than by establishing trade tariffs or prohibitions. This
critical issue is abundantly highlighted in several of the papers
presented today.6
Restraints on factor mobility can arise simply from visa re-
strictions, or, as with legal services, from the restrictions imposed
by regulatory bodies such as the Bar or the Bench on the foreign
nationals desiring to provide such services. In the case of the
United States, complications also arise from the difficulty of get-
ting all states to adopt uniform policies, thus making the question
of reciprocity as a way of opening access even more intractable
than it is otherwise.'
Fourth, it is important to understand why I keep emphasizing
the temporary aspect of "factor-relocation-requiring" services.
What John Barton calls "migratory" (or permanent) as distinct
from "transient" (or temporary) labor flows 9 raise a different, and
more difficult, set of issues which, if brought into the discussion,
would compromise the possibility of making significant progress on
the issue. Two critical reasons underlie this judgment. 10
I See particularly Sydney M. Cone, III, Government Trade Policy and the Professional
Regulation of Foreign Lawyers, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. 169; John H. Barton, Negotiation
Patterns for Liberalizing International Trade in Professional Services, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F.
97.
7 See Cone, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. at 169-73 (cited in note 6).
6 Id.
I See Barton, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. at 100-02 (cited in note 6).
10 There is substantial literature on the subject of international migration which devel-
ops the important differences between "transient" (or "to-and-fro") and "permanent" mi-
gration. See in particular, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, International Factor Mobility, in Robert
Feenstra, 2 Int'l Econ. Theory, chs. 42-45 (1983); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Dependence and
Interdependence, in Gene Grossman, ed., 2 Essays in Development Economics (1985);
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One reason is best seen through Figure 1, a highly simplified
model which teaches an important lesson. Imagine a world popu-
lated only by lawyers.
MARGINAL MARGINAL
PRODUCT PRODUCT
(= Return
to Lawyers) \ /
0A -- Q E
FIGURE 1
Koichi Hamada, Taxing the Brain Drain: A Global Point of View, reprinted in Jagdish N.
Bhagwati, ed., The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate, ch. 5
(1978).
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0 A0 B is the total number of lawyers in countries A and B together.
OAQ is the pre-migration number of lawyers in country A, OBQ in
country B, with OA as the origin for country A and B for country
B. Given other factors and know-how in each country, the marginal
product of more lawyers is assumed to decline in each country:
MPA and MPB being the marginal-product curves for countries A
and B respectively.
Now, before migration, RAQ is the marginal product, and
hence the return (assuming that factors are paid their marginal
product) to lawyers in A. Similarly, RBQ is the return to lawyers in
B. Since RAQ exceeds RBQ, lawyers will migrate from B to A until
their returns become equalized and further movement is not at-
tractive. This will happen when EQ number of lawyers have moved
to A, equalizing the return in both countries at FE.
What is the impact of this migration on economic welfare?
The answer can depend upon whether the migration is considered
"permanent" or "transient". This is because, while the non-mi-
grants in A and the migrants from B are both better off, the non-
migrants in B are worse off. If the migration is permanent, the
country of emigration B may well consider this to be an undesir-
able phenomenon by excluding these migrants' welfare improve-
ments from its calculus. On the other hand, if the migration is
temporary, the sociological and political basis for including their
gains in the overall calculus of national benefits from migration is
clear.
Remembering that the entire area under the marginal product
curve represents the total increment in product as the number of
lawyers increases, the total gains and losses in this model are as
follows:
B:
Gain of Migrants GFDRB
from B
Loss of Nonmigrants FDRB
in B
Total Gain of Migrants GF
and Nonmigrants in B RB (=GFDRB - FDRB)
A:
Total Gain of
Non-migrants in A : RAFG
A+B:
World Gain RA
(including all 3 Groups) FRB (=GFRB + RAFG)
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Evidently, migration improves world welfare, as well as the
welfare of non-migrant nationals in the country of immigration A.
Welfare improves for the country of emigration B, however, only if
the welfare of the migrants is counted. If migrant welfare is not
counted, total welfare in country B diminishes.1
These income-distributional conflicts between migrants and
non-migrants could be moderated if only fiscal policy instruments
could be devised to effect income redistribution. The exit tax,
abused by the Soviet Union, may be thought of as an approximate
exercise of such a policy option. The preferred alternative is the
exercise of income tax jurisdiction on nationals abroad, following,
in effect, the practice of global taxation based on the citizenship
nexus. The United States and the Philippines are the only coun-
tries currently practicing this precept, however; and, despite many
discussions at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment and in several academic fora, it does not seem probable
that the elites of the developing countries which could profit from
changing their tax systems will follow the egalitarian U.S. model
and begin to extend their income tax jurisdiction to their prosper-
ous citizens abroad.1 2
The second reason for distinguishing temporary from perma-
nent immigration is that permanent immigration is generally
judged by moral-philosophical principles very different from the
utilitarian calculus that underlies the economic case for free trade
and free investment flows. The "right to exclude" is simply not
consistent, in general, with the efficient allocation of world re-
sources, because it prevents some labor inputs from being put to
their highest valued use. Instead, a country's exclusion of immi-
grants is often defended on the basis of "communitarian" ideas
such as those developed by philosophers such as Michael Walzer. 5
Such communitarian arguments flatly reject efficiency as the stan-
dard against which government policy is to be judged; they are
based instead on other moral judgments.
11 It should be stressed that this model sharply illustrates the consequences of the dis-
tinction between temporary and permanent migrants through migration's differential im-
pact on the welfare of migrants and non-migrants. The model is not intended to provide a
complete analysis of the welfare consequences of migration in practice.
Is Considerable literature now exists on this subject. See in particular Oliver Oldman
and Richard D. Pomp, The Brain Drain: A Tax Analysis of the Bhagwati Proposal, 3 World
Dev. 754 (1975); Richard D. Pomp, The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing its Nonresi-
dent Citizens, 17 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 245 (1985); Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Martin Part-
ington, eds., Taxing the Brain Drain: A Proposal (1976); Jagdish N. Bhagwati and John
Wilson, eds., Income Taxation and International Personal Mobility (1987).
Is Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983).
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An added reason for concern is that the professional groups
that fear substantial loss of earnings are exceptionally well organ-
ized, and can often adduce attractive arguments to support their
protectionist goals. The American Medical Association, for exam-
ple, can invoke the possibility of deleterious impact on public
health to reject an open-ended services compact permitting free
and permanent immigration. It is important therefore that the
temporary nature of factor relocation, designed to permit service
transactions to transpire, be made explicit in negotiations on ser-
vice trade regulation. If it is not, the possibility of negotiating any-
thing worthwhile will be lost.
III. BRINGING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS
I turn finally to the question of how to convince developing
countries that it is in their best interest to negotiate an interna-
tional compact on service transactions. The central cause of their
hesitation to support negotiations on service trade is the fear that
comparative (i.e. export) advantage in service transactions belongs
entirely to the developed countries. Lobbying for a GATT-type
compact on services has indeed come from sectors in the United
States, such as insurance and banking, which see themselves as ex-
panding rapidly in world markets and thus seek the global reach
that such a services compact would make feasible. In addition, the
proposed service compacts have tended to exclude the temporary-
factor-relocation-requiring services in which the developing coun-
tries are strong, especially services such as construction, defined so
as to include the use of unskilled foreign workers.
Such developing countries as India and Egypt, which are most
reluctant to enter international service trade agreements, will see a
clearer comparative advantage for themselves if the compact per-
mits increased transactions involving temporary relocation of fac-
tors such as skilled and unskilled labor.'" Interestingly, South Ko-
rea has already tried to get into both the European Economic
Community and Canada with offers to undertake construction
projects using Korean workers on a temporary basis, exactly as in
the Middle East. These attempts have not been successful, but
4 See generally Bhagwati, Dependence and Interdependence (cited in note 4); Jagdish
N. Bhagwati, Opening Up Trade in Services: U.S. Should Heed Third World Demands, N.Y.
Times, Section III, col. 1, p. 3 (November 10, 1985); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, GATT and Trade
in Services: How Can We Resolve the North-South Debate, Financial Times, p. 27, col. 6
(November 27, 1985); and Trade in Services: How to Change India Strategy, Economic
Times (Bombay), Editorial Page (Dec. 2, 1985).
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they are totally consonant with the objective of expanding service
transactions in theory and in practice. Excluding labor service
transfers because they involve unskilled workers is conceptually
untenable, because such services clearly belong to the category of
"Immobile-User, Mobile-Provider" described above. Such exclu-
sion could also be self-serving on the part of developed countries,
which should seek rules that are informed by basic principles, as
with GATT on goods, rather than crippled by self-interest.
Even if a services trade compact were initially limited to the
professional service sectors, it should still interest the developing
countries that presently oppose the U.S. initiatives. The expansion
of transactions in professional services will result in a mutual,
rather than one-sided, export advantage. The developing countries
must not be misled into thinking otherwise simply because the ini-
tiative to include such trade in a services compact comes almost
wholly from multinational firms in the developed countries.
The mutual export advantage stems from the fact that profes-
sional services are not uniform. It is best to think of "dualistic"
structures here: within a service sector such as law or accounting
there are both more sophisticated, high-quality services and less
sophisticated, bread-and-butter services. The advantage in tender-
ing services at the "upper" multinational level is certainly likely to
inhere in developed countries: multinational service providers are
following their multinational clients in other sectors as the clients
begin operations abroad. But even here, as the developing coun-
tries expand their own multinationals in non-service sectors, as
they are only just beginning to do, they will begin to piggy-back
their own professional services multinationals on their multina-
tional producers of goods. Developing country providers of more
sophisticated services will therefore stand to benefit from liberali-
zation of service trade.
Moreover, at the "lower" end of the spectrum, the advantage
surely must belong to lawyers, doctors, accountants, etc. in the de-
veloping countries, simply because they are not only bright, acces-
sible and agreeable, but they can also work more cheaply. If they
are allowed to come in under "temporary-factor-relocation" visas
to facilitate service transactions, there seems to be no reason why
they cannot increasingly take a sizeable fraction of the market at
that level.
Such a "dualistic" view is consonant with the modern view of
trade in goods in which international economists have increasingly
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come to terms with mutual trade in "similar products."15 A prod-
uct has numerous characteristics and different countries may well
have an advantage in some characteristics but not in others. This
view is all the more relevant to service transactions where physical
proximity accentuates such differential elements and can lead to
mutual comparative advantages within a sector for suppliers from
different countries.
Although developing countries could find export possibilities
in professional services alone, negotiations between the developing
and the developed countries should certainly proceed, either simul-
taneously or sequentially, in both the professional and the un-
skilled-labor sectors. Once the agenda on services is explicitly
broadened to include all varieties of temporary-factor-relocation-
requiring services, more developing countries should see the mutu-
ality of interests and benefits for themselves in including services
in the forthcoming trade talks. Broadening the agenda, so that the
developing countries see a clear prospect of gaining their own ex-
port advantage within the service sector, would also provide a salu-
tary lesson to the negotiators of the service compact in the devel-
oped countries. For, driven by the momentum of domestic
lobbying, the developed countries tend to overlook the legitimate
concerns of countries that hesitate to open up this new area to
GATT-type rules. The "role reversal" created by requiring devel-
oped countries to face up to concerns about competitive disadvan-
tage in service sectors where they would face successful import en-
try would be most helpful in making the negotiations fair,
equitable and genuinely two-sided.
In particular, this would lead to the realization that we should
be prepared to move only gradually towards establishing a compre-
hensive service trade accord. As in GATT, we should aim at gen-
eral principles, especially such things as most favored nation sta-
tus, bindings and national treatment. Yet we should not forget
that we are dealing with areas in which countries have traditionally
behaved as if the GATT-type "rule-of-law" could not be allowed to
decide "who gets what" in world commerce. Banking and insurance
raise specters of loss of fiduciary and monetary control as well as
loss of effective regulation over vital infrastructure; transborder
flows of information create worries about loss of political sover-
eignty;16 and temporary entry of foreign professionals generates
" See, e.g., Kelvin Lancaster, Variety, Equity and Efficiency (1979); Elhanan Helpman
and Paul Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade (1985).
" See, for example, the acute concerns expressed by Deepak Nayyar, a former official
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fears of dilution of service quality and possible hazard to national
efficiency and health. It is not by chance that services have re-
mained out of the bounds of a GATT-type compact to date. Imag-
ine what would happen if a humorless economist were to propose
that the international location of armaments production should be
determined by comparative advantage!
The ideal way to handle the problem of gradualism may well
be to seek a compact that is based on a set of general principles
and rules as GATT is, but which simultaneously allows for appro-
priate Article XIX-type safeguards to hedge against the "quantity-
outcomes" of such rules. 17 The reverse route of beginning with
quantity-swaps (e.g., India admits ten U.S. banks in exchange for
the U.S. allowing in ten Indian ones), in the hope that general
rules will ultimately emerge, is unlikely to succeed.
in the Indian Ministry of Commerce, in International Trade in Services: Implications for
Developing Countries, ExIm Bank of India Annual Lecture (1986).
17 Article XIX of GATT permits the adoption of trade restraints when market-disrup-
tion-related difficulties emerge in industries facing import competition. It therefore builds
into the GATT an explicit safeguard against unmanageable consequences of adherence to
GATT rules on binding trade commitments.
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